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Abstract
In this paper we investigate the emergence of turn taking in three finitely repeated
games: (i) an allocation game, (ii) a low conflict dominant strategy equilibrium (DSE)
game and (iii) a high conflict DSE game in an experimental setting. The experiments
are run with and without cheap talk communication between participants. In order to
develop experimental conjectures and interpret results we develop a theoretical analy-
sis which incorporates the presence of three types of participant: (i) cooperative, (ii)
competitive and (iii) self seeking. Based on our theoretical analysis we hypothesize that
turn taking may be exhibited experimentally in all three of the games we study when
some participants have cooperative preferences. We find experimentally that turn tak-
ing emerges in all treatments, and its incidence is qualitatively similar in the allocation
and DSE games. While cheap talk increased the rate of cooperative behavior and elim-
inated competitive behaviour, it had at most a small effect on self seeking behavior.
The degree of conflict also had a small effect on the prevalence of turn taking. We
observed, using a repeated matching experiment for the high conflict DSE games, that
a large majority of participants’ behavior can be attributed to one of the three types.
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1 Introduction
Turn taking is a phenomenon observed in a great many daily activities. It arises sponta-
neously in many social contexts, and is a common method by which cooperation is expressed
between individuals. For instance, friends may alternate in paying for meals or coffee drinks.
Couples may take turns in domestic duties such as cooking a meal or cleaning. (Indeed, a
failure to take turns is often a source of conflict.) In a commercial context, fishermen may
take turns in utilising a preferred location. However, while it is known that turn taking can
be an equilibrium to certain repeated games (specifically coordination games), the economics
literature has paid relatively little attention to this issue.
In this paper we present the results of a series of economic experiments designed to
investigate whether, and under what circumstances, turn taking emerges. In particular, we
investigate the emergence of turn taking in three finitely repeated games: (i) an allocation
game,1 (ii) a low conflict dominant strategy equilibrium (DSE) game and (iii) a high conflict
DSE game. (Conflict in the DSE games refers to differences in the payoffs when players
adopt asymmetric strategies.) We explore the behaviour of participants in these games with
and without the opportunity for them to engage in cheap talk.
These games are of particular interest when investigating the emergence of turn taking.
Intuition suggests turn taking may be an aspect of play, though this intuition is not readily
supported by standard game theory. In the allocation game it is well known that there
are multiple equilibria, so it is unclear which of the many equilibria in the finitely repeated
allocation game would be selected by experimental participants (though participants have
been observed to play strategies that are close to that predicted by mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium in coordination games, see Cooper et. al., 1993 and Straub, 1995). Nonetheless,
as turn taking intuitively seems natural way to play the finitely repeated game, it may
constitute a focal equilibria.
In DSE games there is a unique Nash equilibrium in payoffs which does not admit turn
taking. However, it is now well established that experimentally observed behavior is often at
variance with such standard predictions (i.e. Nash equilibrium in payoffs) in finitely repeated
prisoners dilemma and public goods games. This inconsistency is commonly attributed to
socially orientated preferences (Camerer, 2003). In particular, there are many examples
where participants exhibit behavior consistent with cooperative preferences (Andreoni and
Miller, 1992; Cooper et. al., 1996; Brosig, 20022). We are motivated to look for turn
taking in the DSE game because it represents a common form of cooperation which can
achieve the efficient outcome. Indeed we show theoretically that participants who exhibit
cooperative preferences would view a DSE game in payoffs as an allocation game in utilities
1Kuzmics et al. (2014) define an allocation game as involving two issues: a coordination issue and a
competition issue.
2Brosig (2002) finds that cooperative behavior in the prisoner’s dilemma is best thought of as a response
to cooperative preferences than altruism.
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(under appropriately controlled parametrizations). This suggests that if there are sufficient
participants who exhibit cooperative preferences, we should observe turn taking occurring
experimentally.
Not all participants would be expected to exhibit cooperative preferences. The literature
suggests that some participants exhibit self seeking preferences, i.e. be payoff maximisers
as predicted by standard theory. Furthermore, the economics and psychology literature has
identified that some individuals may alternatively exhibit behavior associated with com-
petitive preferences (Knigh and Dubro, 1984; Charness and Grosskopf, 2001; Charness and
Rabin, 2002). Therefore we might expect some participants to view the both the allocation
and DSE games as a competition: their goal being to ’beat’ the other participant by adopting
strategies designed to force an outcome more advantages to themselves than their opponent.
In light of previous findings we expect all three types of preference to coexist in our
the participant population (Knigh and Dubro, 1984; Murphy, et. al., 2011). In order to
develop experimental conjectures and interpret results we develop a theoretical analysis
which incorporates the presence of these three types. In this analysis cooperative types
would wish to turn take in all rounds of a DSE game, including the final round. Following
the analysis by Kreps et. al. (1982) we show how it may be in the interest of self seeking
participants’ to mimic cooperators until the final round of a DSE game, then defect in
order to maximise their pay-off. In this way we can experimentally distinguish between
cooperative and self seeking behavior. We show that competitive players should resist turn
taking in both DSE and allocation games. In the allocation game, we identify an equilibrium
in which self seeking players mimic competitive types. Our theoretical analysis suggests that
in the allocation game: (i) cooperators turn take while competitive types don’t, and (ii)
self seekers may randomise between turn taking and not. In this way there might be a
qualitatively similarity in the incidence of turn taking across both games. However the
equilibria are, of course, quantitatively different in both games, so the quantitative incidence
of turn taking may differ across both games.
Motivated by our theoretical analysis, we hypothesize that turn taking will be exhibited
by some participants in all three games. As noted above, this hypothesis is not predicted by
standard game theory. We find that this is indeed the case, with turn taking emerging in all
treatments. Its incidence is similar in allocation and DSE games. Furthermore, we find that
cheap talk increases the rate of cooperative behavior and eliminates competitive behavior in
the DSE game. Nevertheless, the presence of cheap talk has a small effect on self seeking
behavior. By comparing the high and low conflict DSE games, we observe that increases in
the degree of conflict leads to a small, statistically insignificant, reduction in the prevalence
of turn taking. We also observe, using a repeated matching experiment for the high conflict
DSE games, that a large majority of participants behavior can be attributed to one of the
three types.
There is limited theoretical literature on the emergence of turn taking. Bhaskar (2000)
considers the emergence of turn taking in finitely repeated symmetric coordination game with
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no communication between players. He shows that an efficient symmetric Nash equilibrium
occurs when players to randomise their strategy until coordination occurs, then adopt turn
taking until the game ends. He calls this set of strategies the ’Egalitarian convention’. Lau
and Mui (2008) extend Bhaskar’s results in the case of an infinitely repeated allocation game,
and show the expected time taken to reach a turn taking equilibrium increases with the degree
of conflict between the players (measured as the ratio of the payoffs in the PSNE). Lau and
Mui (2011) show that a turn taking equilibrium may exist for certain classes of infinitely
repeated dominant strategy games (such as a common pool resource games), and that the
expected time taken to reach a turn taking equilibrium increases with the degree of conflict
between the players.
Kuzmics et al. (2014) provide a theoretical analysis of rational play in allocation games.
They show that a focal point equilibrium in these games will be both efficient and simple,
and that equilibria involving turn taking behavior (or a rotation scheme as they describe
it) satisfies their criteria. They find in their experiments that 93% of observations in a 2
person allocation game results in turn taking. Although this is a higher fraction than we
find in our allocation game experiment without cheap talk, it is notable that turn taking is
not universally played in either experiments.
There is limited amount of experimental literature on turn taking. Kaplan and Ruffle
(2011) had participants play a repeated two-player, binary-choice game in which both players
had private information as to their type. In their experimental framework turn taking was
one of two ways for participants to cooperate. They found differences in the behaviour
(i.e. whether to turn take or not) is related to private information. If participant’s types
were similar, turn taking was more likely. There are a number of differences between our
study and that of Kaplan and Ruffle. A key difference is that Kaplan and Ruffle provided
their subjects with private information, whereas we do not. Further, we specifically consider
symmetric games. This allows us to isolate the differences in behavior of our participants
and study in particular their endogenous characteristics, such as preferences.
Cason et al. (2013) found that turn taking emerges experimentally in an indefinitely
repeated common pool resource game. They showed that learning can be important in
determining the incidence of turn taking. In particular, they found that prior experience
with turn taking increases the chance turn taking, and that experienced participants are
more likely to teach inexperienced participants how to undertake turn taking. Fonseca and
Normann (2012) conducted a series of experiments which investigated explicit tacit collusion
between Bertrand oligopolists. In some of these experiments turn taking was detected, even
though (in contrast to our experiment and those cited above) there was no incentive for
turn taking in the game. This suggests (particularly in the light of our study) that some
participants are gaining utility from the cooperation required for turn taking.
In section 2 we provide some theoretical analysis that allow us to develop our experimental
conjectures and interpret our experimental results. The experiment is described in section
3. Conjectures about the behavior of participants in the experiment are presented in section
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3.2. Section 4 presents the results of the experiment. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Theoretical Considerations
2.1 Overview
This paper is concerned with a finitely repeated game, where the duration is common knowl-
edge. A general form of the stage game we consider is shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Game G1
T S
T Z,Z αX, (1− α)X
S (1− α)X,αX 0, 0
We assume that X > 2Z ≥ 0 and 0.5 < α < 1. The parameter α measures the degree of
conflict in the game. Notice that restricting Z < (1− α)X in game G1 yields an allocation
game with two pure strategy Nash Equilibrium and a single Mixed Strategy. Whenever
(1 − α)X < Z, then game G1 has a Dominant Strategy Equilibrium (DSE) corresponding
to (T, T ). We refer to this game as a Dominant Strategy Equilibrium game. 3
Any combination of equilibrium strategies in each of the stage games of the allocation
game represents an equilibrium in the finitely repeated game. In contrast, there is a unique
DSE (and thus pure strategy NE) in pay-offs both in the stage and finitely repeated DSE
game. Although turn taking is efficient, it is not supported by rational play in the finitely
repeated game. However Lau and Mui (2011) show (using folk theorem arguments) that a
turn taking equilibrium may exist for the infinitely repeated DSE game, and the expected
time taken to reach a turn taking equilibrium increases with the degree of conflict between
the players.
We aim to determine whether, and to what extent, turn taking could occur in the finitely
repeated DSE game. We expect turn taking to occur because, we hypothesise, some par-
ticipants have ’socially-oriented preferences’. Intuitively turn taking can be an equilibrium
outcome in the finitely repeated DSE game because cooperative types view DSE game in
pay-offs as an allocation game in utilities. To explore this further we propose participants
are one of three types: (i) self seeking, (ii) cooperative and (iii) competitive. We now provide
a formal definition of these types.
Self seeking players care only about their monetary payoffs. Hence their utility is taken
to be simply us = pii
3The games in which Z < (1 − α)X are called the accommodating case by Lau and Mui (2012), while
they call the games in which Z > (1− α)X the mutual-tough case.
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Cooperative players gain utility from acting with others to achieve a common goal. In
the finitely repeated version of game G1 the co-operative goal in each round is to maximise
joint pay-offs through turn taking. A cooperative player will receive additional utility B > 0
in each round by taking such a cooperative action. Cooperation must be expected to be
mutual. A cooperative players receive zero utility from cooperation in rounds they expect
their partner to act non-cooperatively. Thus the utility of a cooperative player, uo, is given
by:
uo =
{
pii +B if i plays cooperatively
pii if i plays non-cooperatively
(1)
where pii are player i’s payoffs and B > 0 is the utility player i receives from cooperation.
By contrast, competitive players value the difference between their own pay-off and that
of the other player in each round. We assume a player has a receives disuitlity in a round,
F > 0, when their pay-off is lower in that round than that of their partner. For simplicity,
we abstract from the possibility that a player may receive additional utility when their
payoff is greater than that of their partner in a given round. Hence we assume the utility of
competitive players is given by:
um =
{
pii − F if pii < pij
pii if pii > pij
(2)
It is additionally assumed that B and F are sufficiently large, to ensure that cooperative
participants play cooperatively, and that competitive participants play competitively. Specif-
ically:
Assumption 1. B > Z − (1− α)X ≡ B∗ and F > X ≡ F ∗
Assumption 1 ensures that the utility from cooperation, and the disutility from competition,
dominate the pay-offs for the respective types in each round in both the allocation and DSE
games.
2.2 The DSE game with turn taking
We begin our analysis of the DSE game by considering play in the final period
Proposition 1. In the final round of the DSE game: (i) T is the dominant strategy for
competitive, self seeking players and cooperative players whose turn it is to play T in the
final round, and (ii) S is the dominant strategy for cooperative players whose turn it is to
play S in the final round.
Proof of proposition 1. Consider the final round. For either self seekers or competitive types
T is the dominant strategy. For cooperative players who played S in the previous (penulti-
mate) period, cooperative play means they play T in the final period. If cooperative players
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played T in the penultimate period, it will be their turn to play S in the final round. They
will play S in the final period.
(1− α)X +B > Z (3)
or B > B∗. In other words, cooperative players continue turn taking into the final period
provided the gain from cooperation outweighs the material pay-off. This is the case under
assumption 1, and thus cooperative players will play S in the final round if it is their turn.
Proposition 1 identifies the play of each type. It is important to note that the strategy
adopted by participants is independent of their beliefs of the type of other players.
In games with cheap talk, it is conceivable that linguistic clues in participants’ commu-
nications to one another may signal their type. For this reason, and because it is useful in
understanding the implications of having three participant types, we first consider the case
in which type is public information.
Lemma 1. Suppose participant type is public information and assumption 1 holds. An
equilibrium strategy in the DSE game in rounds [1, ..., R-1] for each player type is as follows:
1. Competitive participants play T irrespective of their partner’s type
2. Self seeking participants play:
(a) T when facing a competitive or another self seeking partner
(b) turn taking when facing a cooperative partner
3. Cooperative participants play:
(a) T when facing a competitive partner
(b) turn taking when facing a self seeking or cooperative partner
Playing T in each round is a dominant strategy for competitive participant, so they play
T irrespective of the type of their partner. When self seekers are matched together, the
equilibrium requires both to play T as predicted by standard theory. Cooperative players
gain utility simply by cooperating (i.e. turn taking) so will turn take up to the last period.
Consequently self seekers will turn take up until the penultimate round when matched with
cooperative players.
From proposition 1 and lemma 1 we have established:
Proposition 2. Suppose participant type is public information and assumption 1 holds. It
is an equilibrium strategy for each player to adopt the strategies identified in lemma 1 for
rounds [1,...R-1] and the dominant strategy identified in proposition 1 in the final round.
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Note that the equilibrium described by proposition 2 is not unique. For instance, an
equilibrium with no-cooperation (in which all cooperative types believe cooperation will
not occur) is possible. Nonetheless, proposition 2 establishes that turn taking can be an
equilibrium strategy for some participants in the finitely repeated DSE game when there are
3 types of participant.
Proposition 2 could be applied to experimental DSE games with cheap talk, if it is
assumed that a participant’s communication signalled their type. However in games without
cheap talk, it is necessary to model an individual’s type as private information. To this end,
denote the probability that a player of type j believes their partner is a cooperator in round
τ as λjτ . Then:
Proposition 3. Consider the DSE game in which participant type is private information and
assumption 1 holds. Then the following are requirements for a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
that involves turn taking to exist:
1. Competitive participants play (T, T ) in all rounds
2. Cooperative participants continue turn taking in rounds r > I when there is a sufficient
history of turn taking from period I. In particular, a cooperative player will play S in
the final round following a sufficient history of turn taking from period I.
3. Self seeking participants would only turn take in rounds r ∈ [I, R − 1] provided their
partner exhibits an uninterrupted history of turn taking from period I and:
λsR−1 >
Z − (1− α)X
αX − Z = 1−
[αX − Z] + [2Z −X]
αX − Z ≡ λ
∗
R−1 (4)
where period I is the round in which turn taking is initiated
Proposition 3 provides useful insight (in the form of the conditions necessary for turn
taking to occur when there is a large but finite number of rounds) which are be used as the
basis for our experimental conjectures. For instance, T in each round is a dominant strategy
for competitive players, irrespective of the type of their partner. Thus, as in the case where
type is public information, competitive players would be expected to play T in all rounds.
A self seeking participant’s action depends on their belief of their partner’s type. For
example, if the self seeking player is certain their partner is either self seeking or competitive
they will play T in each round. To engage, and then continue, with turn taking, a self
interested play must have a sufficient belief they are matched with a cooperative player. The
partner’s type may be signalled by their history of play. To be cooperative, it is necessary
that their partner exhibit uninterrupted turn taking, as this action maximises a cooperative
player’s utility. If their partner was to deviate from turn taking, this would signal that they
are self seeking. In this case the logic of backward induction, as summarised by lemma 1,
means turn taking is not an equilibrium.
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Cooperative types will engage in turn taking whenever they view their actions as cooper-
ative. Thus they will engage in turn taking with those types who are also willing to engage
in turn taking, i.e. self seeking and other cooperative types.
Proposition 3 does not indicate how turn taking might be initiated, and thus does not
identify equilibrium outcomes. When type is private information, a participant’s strategy
choice, in particular their initial strategy choice, sends a signal to their partner regarding
their type. This may influence their partner’s strategy choice in subsequent rounds. Thus a
comprehensive analysis of the prefect Bayesian Equilibria of the game, when participant type
is private information and R is large, is of such complexity as to be beyond the scope of this
paper.4 However, while a theoretical analysis of how turn taking is initiated in equilibrium
seems intractable in the DSE game with a large number of rounds, it is possible to find and
analyse a perfect Bayesian equilibrium involving turn taking when the number of rounds
is sufficiently small. This case is shows turn taking is an equilibrium outcome in the DSE
game, and proves sufficient to identify behavioural conjectures for our experimental study.
Appendix B analyses a 3-round DSE game. To further simplify the analysis of this
game, we assume only cooperative and self seeking types are present in the population. We
consider two ways in which turn taking is initiated. First, it is shown in appendix B.1 that
a separating equilibrium can exist in which cooperative types play S and self seeking types
play T in the first round. Turn taking occurs when self seeking types meet cooperative types,
and they both coordinate in subsequent rounds. It is necessary that the cooperative types
are a sufficiently large proportion of the population for this strategy to be an equilibrium.
If cooperative types were too small a proportion of the population, a self seeking type could
gain by playing S in round 1, effectively signalling they are cooperative when they are not.
In this equilibrium the fraction of participants that engage in turn taking is:
1− (1− λ)2 (5)
where λ is the proportion of the population that are cooperative. That is, all participants
undertake a turn taking type strategy except those self seekers who are matched with other
self seekers.
It is shown in Appendix B.2 that another equilibrium involving turn taking can exist in
a three round game, one in which cooperative types play S in round 1 and self interested
types randomise in round 1. This ’semi-pooling’ equilibrium results in turn taking when
cooperative types are matched with each other and when a self seeking type is matched with
a cooperative type. However, turn taking can also result when two self seeks are matched:
specifically when a self seeker who plays T in round 1 is matched with a self seeker who
plays S in round 1. In effect, the latter is initially mimicking the actions of a cooperative
player. This behaviour parallels the equilibrium strategy identified by Kreps et al. (1982).
4See the comments of Kreps et. al. (1982) regrading the technical difficulties associated with the simpler
case of cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma.
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They show, in the context of the finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma, that self interested
types may gain by acting as if they are a cooperative type, and cooperate to induce beneficial
cooperation from their partner. However, from proposition 1, this participant will be revealed
as being self interest in the final round if it is that player’s turn to play S. A self interested
participant would defect from turn taking and play T under these circumstances. A player
who plays S in the final period must be an cooperator.
The semi pooling equilibrium requires that the proportion of cooperative types not be
too small (otherwise a self seeker will not turn take in round 2). It also requires that the
proportion of cooperative types in the population not be too large, otherwise a self seeker
would adopt S as a pure strategy in round 1. In this equilibrium the fraction of participants
who undertake turn taking is:
1− p21(1− λ)2 (6)
where p1 is the probability that a self seeker plays T in round 1. That is, all participants
undertake a turn taking type strategy except those self seekers who play T and are matched
with other self seekers who plays T .
The faction of self seeking types which end up turn taking in the semi pooling equilibrium
is higher than the fraction who turn take in the separating equilibrium. In neither case do
all self seeking types undertake turn taking.
Finally, an increase in the degree of conflict, α, may affect p1. It is shown in Appendix
B.2 that an increase in the degree of conflict in the DSE game would increase the frequency
with which self seeking participants initially play T in the semi pooling equilibrium. By (6),
this would decrease the prevalence of turn taking.
2.3 The allocation game with turn taking
We now turn our attention to the allocation game. It is straightforward to show the following
equilibrium proposition in the allocation game, with public information of types:
Proposition 4. Suppose participant type is public information and assumption 1 holds. An
equilibrium strategy in the allocation game is as follows:
1. Competitive participants play T irrespective of their partner’s type
2. Self seeking participants play:
(a) S when facing a competitive partner
(b) turn taking when facing a cooperative partner or another self seeking partner
3. Cooperative participants play:
(a) S when facing a competitive partner
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(b) turn taking when facing a self seeking or cooperative partner
When both participants are either self seeking or cooperative, there a multiple Nash equilib-
rium. Proposition 4 indicates that one of these, arguably the focal equilibrium, involves turn
taking. In contrast, when one participant is competitive, the Nash equilibrium is unique as,
under assumption 1, playing T in each round yields a higher utility to the competitive player
than turn taking. In addition, when the competitive player’s partner is either self seeking or
cooperative, the competitive player receives a monetary pay-off double that they would be
receive if they adopted a turn taking strategy.
We now consider play when participant type is private. Intuitively, as with the DSE
game, it will make no difference to the strategy of competitive types whether their type is
public or private information. Similarly, cooperative players will also undertake turn taking
when type is private information, provided their partner has acted cooperatively, because
there is a sufficient history of turn taking.
However, in the allocation game with private information, self seeking players have the
option of mimicking competitive players. This option to mimic a competitive type only
remains available to self seekers if they have no history of playing S, otherwise their actions
would have signalled that they are not competitive. To this extent playing S in the first round
signals that a player is not competitive, and thus reduces the strategic options available to self
seekers. These arguments suggest that self seeks may choose not turn take in the allocation
game, even if facing a cooperative player.
To assess this possibility it is necessary to consider how, and if, turn taking is initiated
in equilibrium play. However, as noted above, a theoretical analysis of this possibility seems
intractable when there are a large number of rounds. However, in appendix C we find
perfect Bayesian equilibrium in a two round allocation game, which will be sufficient to
provide our behavioural conjectures for our experiment. To further simplify this analysis,
only competitive and self seeking types are assumed present in the population.
Two equilibria are described in Appendix C. First, it is shown in Appendix C.1 that a
’mimicking’ equilibrium can exist - in which self seeking types randomise in the first round.
When two self seekers are matched in round 1, if one plays T and the other plays S, this play
is repeated in round 2. In this equilibrium turn taking does not exist. Second, it is shown
in Appendix C.2 that a turn taking equilibrium also exists, again in which self seeking types
randomise in round 1. If these types coordinate in round one (i.e. one plays T and the other
S) then they switch strategies (i.e. turn take) in the second round. In this equilibrium the
fraction of participants that engage in turn taking is:
1− µ− p21(1− µ) = (1− p21)(1− µ) (7)
Note we are treating those matched self seeking players who play S in round 1 as turn takers,
as if there were more rounds their strategy would result in turn taking (as both revealed
they are self seeking rather than competitive).
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3 The Experiment
3.1 Experimental design
Experiments were carried out at the University’s experimental economics laboratory using
specialized experimental software between May 2012 and October 2014. Participants were
recruited from the University’s student population through a web-based recruitment system.
On arrival at the experiment, each participant was randomly assigned to a computer, pro-
vided with a set of instructions and asked to complete a quiz to ensure they understood
the experiment. The instructions and quiz provided to each of the participants in one of
the treatments is provided in Appendix ??. Once participants answered all the questions
correctly, they received a password enabling them to access the experiment.
3.1.1 Single matching experiment
The single matching experiments involved sixteen pairs of participants played 30 rounds
of one of the three stage games shown in Table 2. In treatment 1 participants played the
allocation game, in treatment 2 they played the low conflict DSE game, and in treatment 3
they played the high conflict DSE game. Matching of participants was done randomly. Each
treatment was conducted with and without cheap talk.
Treatment 1 is conducted to identify the strategic behavior of players in a finitely repeated
coordination game. As noted above the game has many Nash equilibria, consisting of the
Nash equilibria in each stage game. The mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the stage game
used in treatment 1 requires player to play T with a probability of 2/3. The expected
payoff to player adopting the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is 200. If players coordinate
immediately on turn taking in the first period their payoff is 450.
Table 2: Stage Games
Allocation game Low confict DSE game High Conflict DSE game
T S T S T S
T 0, 0 20, 10 T 11, 11 20, 10 T 11, 11 29, 1
S 10, 20 0, 0 S 10, 20 0, 0 S 1, 29 0, 0
3.1.2 Repeated matching experiment
Each repeated matching treatment consisted of four sessions with 8 participants. Within
each session participants were sequentially randomly matched (without replacement) with
each other 5 times. In each of the matchings the participants played 14 rounds of the high
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conflict DSE game shown in table 2. Two treatments, with and without cheap talk, were
conducted. Each treatment had sixteen pairs of participants.
In designing the repeated matching experiment, we were constrained by the maximum
time available for sessions of 2 hours. We restricted the rounds per match to 14, as we judged
this the minimum number of rounds required for turn taking to become well established.
Given 14 rounds per match, the number of matches were at 5 capped by time constraints.
We decided to use the high conflict version of the DSE game to highlight, in participants
minds, the strategic considerations they face.
3.2 Behavioral Conjectures
We develop a number of conjectures of the outcome of our experiment based on the theoretical
discussion above. First, we have argued that social preferences transform the DSE game
into an allocation game for competitive players and consequently, the DSE game may have
equilibria involving turn taking. Hence:
Conjecture 1. Turn taking is observed in all treatments.
The presence of turn taking in the coordination game is to be expected in light of the
arguments presented Bhaskar (2000) and Lau amd Mui (2008). However, the presence of
turn taking in the DSE game suggests that player either have, or believe other players have,
cooperative preferences.
Utilising the above theory, we can identify the presence of each of the participant types
in each of the DSE game treatments in the following way:
• An observation contains a cooperative participants if one participant plays S in the
final round.5
• An observation contains a self-seeker if after a period of turn taking the participant
plays T when it it their turn to play S, and continues to do so until the game ends.
• An observation contains a competitive participant if the participant resists adopting
turn taking.
If the population contains each of these three types, then the following conjecture will
hold:
Conjecture 2. Behaviour consistent with the presence of cooperative, self seeking and com-
petitive types is observed in all treatments.
5Both participants would be cooperative if they both played S in the final round, though this is never
observed.
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We ran each treatment with and without cheap talk. In the allocation game the introduc-
tion of cheap talk allowed for coordination between the players. Cheap talk, in the absence
of social preferences, should not change the play in the DSE games. However, Meier’s (2007)
survey of experimental evidence suggests pro sociality is increased by the presence of cheap
talk. Thus we would expect cheap to increase the proportion of cooperators (relative to no
cheap talk) and thus observe more turn taking in both the DSE and allocation games. Thus
we conjecture:
Conjecture 3. The presence of cheap-talk increases the incidence turn taking in both the
allocation and DSE games.
As shown above, it is in the interests of self seeking players to mimic the play of coop-
erators up until the final round, and it is an equilibrium strategy for at least some to do
so. Thus we expect the proportion of participants who turn take to be less than or equal
to the sum of proportions of matches between participants who are both either competitors
or self seekers (equivalently less than 1 minus matches involving self seekers). In the allo-
cation game, however, it is in the interest of self seekers to mimic the play of competitors,
and as such this may be an equilibrium strategy. Again we would expect the proportion of
participants who turn take to be less than or equal to the matches between participants who
are both either competitors or self seekers. Note that in the both the allocation and DSE
games there exist equilibria which do not involve turn taking. In light of these results it is
natural to ask whether we see qualitatively similar strategies adopted in the allocation and
DSE games. We thus propose the following conjecture:
Conjecture 4. The frequency of turn taking in the allocation game is equal to that in the
DSE game
We noted that changing the degree of conflict may affect the incidence of turn taking in
the DSE game, because it reduces the frequency in which pairs of self seekers undertake turn
taking in semi-pooling perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Thus we make the following conjecture:
Conjecture 5. An increase in the degree of conflict in the DSE game reduces the incidence
of turn-taking.
In perfect Bayesian equilibria of the three round DSE and two round allocation games
(analysed in Appendices B and C), self seeking types and competitive types are the only ones
to play T in the initial round, and self seeking types play S in the initial round. We might
expect therefore that those who defect from turn taking in the final round predominately
play T in the initial round, while those who do not defect predominately play S. Thus we
conjecture:
Conjecture 6. Those participants who defect from turn taking in the final round play T in
the first round. Those participants who do not defect from turn taking in the final round play
S in the first round.
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We now consider the issue of learning. Cason, Lau and Mui (2013) show that some
participants, being taught by other participants, can learn to turn take in an indefinitely
repeated game. Thus, in the single matching game it might be argued that players adopt
turn taking only because they do not understand or capable of undertaking the backward
induction necessary to realise turn taking is not subgame perfect in pay-offs. We adopt the
following:
Conjecture 7. In the repeated matching game, the prevalence of turn taking increases and
the prevalence of cooperative play diminishes as the number of matches increases.
This conjecture is premised on the assumption that each participant is one of three types.
If this is the case, we should observe individual participants playing as predicted for their
type.
Conjecture 8. In the repeated matching game, each participants plays each of their 5
matches in accordance with the behavior predicted by one of the three types.
There is a potential conflict arising from conjectures 7 and 8. For instance, a self seeking
player may only learn to defect from turn taking in the final round after observing this play
in another player. Such a player may initially appear to be cooperative, but later revealed
to be self seeking.
4 Results and Analysis
The strategies and payoffs of the players in each round of each treatment in shown in graphi-
cally in Appendix D. This data is summarised in Table 3 for the single matching treatments
and in table 4 for the repeated matching treatments.
First consider the single matching treatments. We assume turn taking has been observed
if there are 4 strategy switches in a row, as that has a probability of occurring of 1 per cent
under the MSNE in the allocation game. Table 3 captures some of the important features
of turning taking revealed in the single matching experiments. The first column in Table 3
shows the number of observations in each treatment which exhibit turn taking. The second
column gives the number of observations in which, once turn taking has commenced, turn
taking experiences an interruption prior to the end of the treatment. The fourth column
gives the number of interruptions to turn taking occurring in the treatment. The fifth column
indicates the number of interruptions to turn taking that advantages one player. The sixth
column shows the number of observations in each treatment in which one player plays S
and the other player plays T in the final round. The final column indicates the number of
observations in which player who have been turn taking defect to (T, T ) in the last or second
to last round.
The data in Table 3 yields:
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Table 4: Repeated matching
TRN TRC
Match 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Turn taking 9upriseuprise 8upriseuprise 8upriseuprise 10upriseuprise 10upriseuprise 16 16 16 16 16
TT final 7upriseuprise 5upriseuprise 7upriseuprise 5upriseuprise 4upriseuprise 14 14 13 15 12
Defect final 2 4 2 5 6 2 2 3 1 4
Advantageous deviation 2 0 1 5 0 1 0 0 4 2
Disadvantageous deviation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2
uprise significantly difference at α = 0.05 upriseuprise significantly difference at α = 0.01
Significance levels determined using the two samples proportion t-test
Observation 1. (i) Turn taking is observed in all treatments. Once started, turn taking
continues uninterrupted in 70 per cent of turn taking observations in T1N, in 64 per cent of
turn taking observations in T2N, and 89 percent of turn taking observations in T3N. Turn
taking is not observed in 38 per cent of observations in T1N, in 31 per cent of observations
in T2N, and 44 percent of observations in T3N
This observation is consistent with conjecture 1.
There are deviations from turn taking once it is established in both the allocation and
DSE games. Deviating from turn taking in the DSE game advantages a player whose turn
it is to play S, while disadvantages a play whose turn it is to play T. Deviating from turn
taking disadvantages both players. The interruptions to turn taking might either be due to
(i) participants making an error in whose turn it was (ii) participants trying to gain an edge
over the turn taking strategy. In the allocation game, once turn taking is initiated, unilateral
deviation would lead to loss, and thus would be expected to be an error. However in the DSE
game, a unilateral deviation in which a participant plays T rather than S could increase the
participant’s payoff if turn taking resumes. On the other hand, it would be expected that
when a player plays S rather than T , that the deviation from turn taking is an error.
The proportion of observed deviations does not vary significantly across or within treat-
ments, in particular across T2N, T2C and T3C. In these treatments advantageous deviations
dominate. We observed only one deviation in T3N, which is not advantageous (so presum-
ably a mistake). The players in the chat treatments typically framed their deviations from
turn taking as a mistake. Given that the total number of deviations in Treatment 1 is not
significantly different to those in T2N, T2C and T3C, and virtually all deviations in Treat-
ment 1 are disadvantageous, this explanation is plausible. On the other hand, frequency of
advantageous deviations in T2N, T2C and T3C, suggests some of players are attempting to
gain an edge over their partners.
Turn taking does not always come about through a process of coordination using ran-
domisation. For example, in some instances (T2N: players 3 and 4, and players 7 and 8 in
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group 2) it appears one player initiates turn taking (by consecutively playing T and S) and
waits for their partner to coordinate with them.
Of the no-cheap talk observations where turn taking did not occur, one or both players
adopted T at least 75 percent of the time. Some participants (T2N: group 2 player 1, group
4 player 2 T3N: group 3 player 4, group 4 players 7 and 8) played T throughout the whole
experimental session. Note that this result could not be due to a coordination failure when
cheap talk is not available. By playing the Egalitarian convention, the probability that
people repeatedly play the DSE and do not coordinate for 30 rounds is vanishingly small.
Turn taking is not exhibited in all observations. Let us say (by analogy to the definition
of turn taking) that players coordinate on the DSE in the repeated game if the DSE is played
in four consecutive stage games. With these definitions it is possible for players to exhibit
both turn taking and coordinate on the DSE at different stages during the game. However
this combination is not observed in our data. In fact once turn taking is established, apart
from brief deviations, it continued until either the last or penultimate round. This makes
the division between observations with or no turn taking stark, suggesting participants differ
qualitatively in type.
From Table 3 we find that:
Observation 2. (i) Turn taking continued to the last round in 36.4 per cent of observations
in treatment T2N and 55.6 per cent of observations in treatment T3N. Turn taking continued
to the final round in 81.25 per cent of observations in T2C and in 62.5 per cent of observations
in T3C. (ii) Defections from turn taking in either the last or penultimate round occurred in
37.5 per cent of observations in treatments T2N and in 12.5 per cent of observations in T3N.
Defections from turn taking in either the last or penultimate round occurred in 12.5 per cent
of observations in T2C and in 25 per cent of observations in T3C.
Observation 2(i) is behaviorally consistent with the presence of cooperative types in all
treatments, while observation 2(ii) is behaviorally consistent with the presence of self seek-
ing types. Observation 1, taken in conjunction with Observation 2(i), indicates behavior
consistent with the presence of competitive types in treatments without cheap talk. Taken
together these observations are consistent with conjecture 2, except that competitive behav-
ior is not observed in the chat treatments of the DSE game (T2C and T3C). Furthermore:
Observation 3. Cheap talk increases the prevalence of turn taking.
Cheap talk significantly increased the occurrence of turn taking. As shown in Table 3, the
proportion of observed turn taking with communication (T.C) is significantly higher than
the proportion without communication (T.N) in all treatments. As noted earlier, in T2C
and T3C turn taking occurred in all cases compared to 11/16 and 9/16 of the observations
respectively without communication. The proportion of observed turn taking at the end is
also significantly greater with cheap talk compared to no communication across all treatments
(p < 0.05). This finding is consistent with conjecture 3.
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Without cheap talk a minority of observations in the DSE games involved participants
exhibiting cooperative behavior. However, cheap talk substantially increased the instances
of cooperative behavior to the point where it is exhibited by a majority of the observations.
It could be that some pairs simply did not learn to take turns, and that apparent compet-
itive behavior is due to ignorance (Cason et. al., 2013 show how participants can learn turn
taking from one another). The fact that participants readily coordinated on turn taking in
the cheap talk treatments might suggest this. However, in all but one of the no-cheap-talk
observations that settled into the DSE, there was some early attempt by one participant to
initiate turn taking by alternating their strategy. It appears therefore that the failure to
initiate turn taking was because some participants resisted adopting turn taking in the DSE
game treatments with no cheap talk.
In one observation in T1C, one player (player 2, group 6) made an undisguised attempt
to force the pure strategy Nash equilibrium that advantages themselves, in effect indicating
to their partner that they would play T no matter what. Such a player, in effect, cast
themselves as a competitive player. It can be seen that the player carried out this threat for
some time, though eventually relented. In both chat and no chat at least one player tried to
force the PSNE that advantaged them.
There is a significant reduction in the proportion of turn takers who defected in the final
round from T2N to T2C. However, the equivalent change in Treatment 3 is not significant.
Indeed, although cheap talk decreases defectors as a proportion of the population in T2N, it
increases defectors as a proportion of the population in T3N. Nonetheless, neither of these
changes in defectors (as a proportion of the population) are significant (p=0.07 and p=0.23
respectively). Thus, the proportion of observations in each treatment in which self seeking
behavior was exhibited does not vary significantly across treatments. This suggests that
cheap talk has the effect of causing those who would be competitive in treatments without
cheap talk to be cooperative when they can engage in cheap talk. This is consistent with
cheap talk influencing only the behavior of those with social preferences, leaving self seeking
behavior unchanged.
The fact that defection occurred overwhelmingly in the last period of the DSE game
treatments suggests that self seekers were relatively confident they were playing a cooperator.
The inequality (4) in proposition 3 provides the precise condition for self seekers to turn
take in the penultimate period. From (4) the critical proportion of turn takers who are
cooperators, λs∗, is λs∗ = 1/9 in T2 and λs∗ = 5/9 in T3. From table 3 the proportion
of observations in which turn takers are cooperators can be estimated as λsR−1 = 4/11 in
T2N and λsR−1 = 10/18 in T3N . The proportions are higher in the respective cheap talk
treatments. Thus condition 4 would appear to be satisfied in all DSE game treatments, it is
rational for self seekers to turn take in these treatments. The data in Table 3 also yields:
Observation 4. The incidence of turn taking in the allocation game is not significantly
different the incidence in the DSE game.
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This observation is consistent with conjecture 4. While we found no significant difference
in the proportion turn taking across the different games (N : χ2 = 0.533, p = 0.3829;C :
χ2 = 0.2.04, p = 0.18), in games with cheap talk, turn taking occurred in all observations in
each of the DSE games while turn taking did not occur in 1/16 of the observations of the
allocation game. Note the degree of conflict is the same in T1 as in T2 and TN, while it is
higher in T3. The higher conflict in T3 may have the effect of reducing the incidence of turn
taking in T3N.
Observation 5. An increase in the degree of conflict is associated with only a small reduction
in the incidence of turn taking when there is no cheap talk.
We found no statistically significant difference in the incidence of turn taking across
treatments (p > 0.05) and so support for assumption 1 rather than conjecture 5. The degree
of conflict did not influence the prevalence of turn taking when there is cheap talk, suggesting
that more severe changes in the degree of conflict may be necessary to produce a behavioural
change.
Note the increase in conflict is associated with an increase in turn taking in the final
period. The proportion of groups turn taking at the end is found to be significantly greater
with cheap talk in all treatments (p < 0.05). However, there was no significant difference in
the proportion defecting in the last round between or within treatments (p > 0.05). Cheap
talk, while improving the proportion turn taking at the end, did not improve the proportion
of groups defecting in the last round.
Turn taking was less prevalent in the DSE game without cheap talk when the conflict
was higher. This observation is consistent with conjecture 5. Note that this effect is not
particularly strong, and the increased conflict did not affect the prevalence of turn taking in
the treatments with cheap talk. Note also that turn taking was more likely to be maintained
when conflict is higher. One explanation of this finding is that players were more careful to
strictly maintain turn taking when the costs of deviating from it are higher.
Observation 6. (i) Of the 17 observations of defection in the DSE treatments, 11 involved
the participant playing T in the round turn taking was initiated. (ii) Of the 29 observations
of non-defection in the final round of the DSE treatment, 25 involved the participant playing
T in the round turn taking was initiated.
Recall that the optimal turn taking strategy for a self seekers is to play T in round 1,
and defect in round 30. This happened in 9 out of the 11 rounds in which defectors played T
in the initial round. Of the 6 observations in which defectors in the final round did not play
T in the round in which turn taking was initiated, 2 of them encouraged turn taking early
in the game by alternating strategy. In this way they might be seen to mimic cooperators
in accordance with observation 6(i) and consistent with conjecture 6.
Observation 6(ii) does not appear to consistent with conjecture 6 as only 4 out of the 29
observations conforming with it. Of the 25 inconsistent observations, 20 were in cheap talk
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treatments. Additionally, 18 of the 29 involved turn taking in every round. Of these 18, 15
are in the cheap talk treatments. One explanation of this finding is that, in a cheap talk
game, a cooperative player who suspects their partner is self seeking might have played T in
the initial round to ensure cooperation from their partner in all rounds, especially the final
rounds. A similar argument might also be applied to remaining 5 observations in cheap talk
treatments that were inconsistent with conjecture 6(ii) in which there is interruption to turn
taking or delay in initiating turn taking.
There were 5 observations in treatments T2N and T3N which were not consistent with
6(ii). In these cases the cooperative participants may have been trying to enforce cooperation
in the final round (as suggested for the cheap talk treatment) or they may have adopted a
mixed strategy.
We now turn to consider the repeated matching treatments. The summary results pre-
sented in Table 4, suggest that the conclusions derived from the single matching treatments
also apply to the repeated matching treatments. Furthermore the data in Table 4 yields:
Observation 7. In TRN, there is a small increase in the prevalence of turn taking as the
number of matches increases. There is also a small increase in the number of final period
defectors, and a small decrease in turn taking persisting into the final period.
This observations suggests that some learning on how to turn take, and how to defect in
the final round, may have occurred. However, the changes observed over the rounds is not
statistically significant. Some further insight is found by looking at individual’s behavior in
the repeated matching treatments:
Observation 8. A large proportion of participants play to type.
Observation 8 is established by reference to the repeated matching graphs in appendix
D. Individuals are referred to by the identifier IJ, where I ∈ {1, ..., 8} is the group they
belong to and J ∈ {1, ..., 8} is their player number in their group. First consider TRN
(I ∈ {1, ..., 4}). Three participants (31,32, 48) in TRN defected in the last round of 3 or
more of the matches. None of these participants played S in the final round of any of their
matches. However, in all matches, two of the three played S either before their partners
first played S or in the same round as their partner first played S. This could be viewed as
encouraging their partners into turn taking, and is consistent with the behaviour of a self
seeker mimicking a cooperator. One player (13) defected in the final round twice (match B
and E). However this participant also played S in the final rounds twice (match A and C).
The defection in these cases could be interpreted as ’evening the score’ for the reluctance of
participant 13’s partners to initial reluctance to undertake turn taking. Seven participants
(11, 21, 22, 33 42,43,47) defected in only one match in the final round. Four of these did
not play S in the final round of any other matching. Three participant who defected once
also played S one or more times. One of the three (33) seems to be ’reciprocating’ an earlier
advantageous defection by their partner, while another (22) seems to be responding to the
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initial resistance of the partner to coordinate on turn taking. One player (42) seemed to
adopted the defection strategy in the final round. In total seven participants in TRN (11,
21,31,32,43,47,48) behaved in a manner consistent with them being self seekers.
Six participants in TRN (12, 17, 23, 27, 28, 36) did not engage with turn taking, thus
behaved in a manner consistent with being competitive types.
Thirteen participants (14, 15, 18, 24, 25, 26, 34, 35, 37, 41. 44, 45, 46) played S in at
least one final round of their 5 matches, and did not defect in the final round of any match.
Indeed once participant (41) played S in the final round of all of their 5 matches. This
behviour is consistent with them being cooperative type.
Of the remaining 7 participants in TRN, four exhibited both self seeking and cooperative
behaviors (13,22,33,42). This could be due to learning self seeking behavior through experi-
ence, though two of these participants played S in the final round after defecting in the final
round in a previous match (13, 33). Further the mixture of behaviours may be explained
in terms of the specifics of the interaction between participants, such as that of player 13
discussed above.
Two players engaged in turn taking in at least one match but did not either play S in
the final period or defect in the final period (16,38). It is not therefore possible to classify
the behavior of these players.
Now consider TCN (I ∈ {5, ..., 8}). Two participants (67,75) in TRC defected in the last
round of 4 or more of the matches. None of these participants played S in the final round
of any of their matches. However, in all matches, both played S in a round before, or in the
same round, as their partner first played S. Three participants (71, 76, 83) defected in only
one match in the final round. One of these (76) did not play S in the final round of any
other matching. The remaining two who defected once also played S in one or more earlier
matches. In total three participants in TRC (67,75, 76) behaved in a manner consistent with
being self seekers in all matches, while two (71,83) seem to have learned to behave as self
seekers.
There were no participants in TRC who do not engage with turn taking. Thus there is
no evidence of competitive play in the cheap talk treatment.
Nine participants in TRC (52, 53, 64, 66, 67, 74, 75, 76, 88) did not play S in the final
round, and six of these (52, 53, 64, 66, 74, 88) did not defect in the final round either. It is
thus not possible to classify these 6 players, though it is possible they are cooperative types
who ensure cooperation in the final round by playing T in the initial round.
The remaining 21 played S at least once in the final round and did not defect. Their
behaviour is consistent with that of a cooperative type. One participant (51) played S in
the final round of all of their 5 matches.
Table 5 summaries the above identification of player types made for both the chat and
no chat treatments of the repeated matching treatment, and the p values for their difference
using a two samples proportion t-test. The introduction of chat significantly reduces the
number of participants identified as competitive, while it increases the number of participants
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Table 5: Number of types identified in repeated matching experiments
No Chat Chat p value
Competitive 6 0 0.006*
Self seeking 7 5 0.26
Cooperative 13 21 0.02*
Not classified 6 6 0.5
*Significant at the 0.05 level.
identified as cooperative. The number of participants identified as self seeking and the
number not classified does not change significantly with the introduction of cheap talk.
5 Discussion
This paper presents evidence on the behavior of individuals who played the finitely repeated
allocation and DSE games. The key finding from our experiments is that turn taking arises in
the finitely repeated versions of both the allocation and DSE games. Turn taking is frequently
undertaken by participants in the allocation game, though there are multiple Nash equilibria
in payoffs. Similarly, turn taking is frequently undertaken by participants in the DSE game,
though it is not an equilibrium strategy in pay-offs. Indeed we found no statistical difference
between the frequency in which turn taking was conducted in the allocation and DSE games.
Using the theory analysis we have presented, we show the observed behaviour of partic-
ipants is consistent with the presence in our experiment of three behavioural types: coop-
erative, competitive and self seeking types.6 Three experimental findings suggest that some
participants (around 40% without cheap talk and 65% with cheap talk) behave in a manner
consistent with cooperative preferences. First, the presence of turn taking is suggestive of
cooperative preferences, as cooperative preference transform the DSE game in payoffs to a
coordination game in utilities. Second, the observation that some player continue turn taking
into the last round is consistent with cooperative preferences. This is because the benefit
of continued cooperation (i.e. turn taking) to these participants outweighs the financial
disadvantages to them of continuing turn taking. Third, previous findings suggest that the
introduction of cheap talk is likely to reinforce pro-social preferences, of which cooperative
preferences could be thought of as an example.
6Note our experiment is not designed to directly observe cooperative and competitive preferences per se,
but the behavior associated with them. Indeed, in the context of altruism, Andreoni et al (2008) noted that
“we only know when we don’t see it”.
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We observed that some participants (approximately 20%) in DSE treatments without
cheap talk behaved in a manner consistent with competitive preferences. However, com-
petitive play vanished in our DSE game treatments with the introduction of cheap talk.
The decline in competitive behaviour with the introduction of cheap talk was approximately
the same as the increase in cooperative behavior with the introduction of cheap talk. This
suggests that both those exhibiting cooperative and competitive behaviors have socially ori-
entated preferences, but the social context (cheap talk vs no communication) determines
how these preferences are expressed in some participants.
The findings from the DSE game treatments also point to the presence of self seekers pref-
erences (around 20% with cheap talk and 16% with cheap talk): these are participants who
found it rational to mimic cooperators by adopting turn taking to the final or penultimate
round. The introduction of cheap talk only slightly reduced the proportion of participants
using this strategy, though not significantly. This suggests these participants, while aware
that some other participants respond to social influences, were relatively insensitive to social
influence themselves. The proportion of self seeking behaviour decreased as a proportion
of the population, though not significantly, with the introduction of cheap talk. This sug-
gests the proportion of the population who does not have socially orientated is not strongly
affected by this change in social context.
We found it difficult to classify the remaining participants (approximately 20% of the no
communication treatments). These participants exhibited both self seeking and cooperative
behavior. In these case participants may either have been acting reciprocally (which is not
modelled in our theory) or learning by doing which behaviors best suited their preferences.
Overall, due to the apparent heterogeneity of preferences, there is no single interpretation
of play in the finitely repeated allocation and DSE game. This is particularly true of the
DSE game without cheap talk, where behavior varied markedly from the (unique) Nash
equilibrium in payoffs. The incorporation of cheap into the DSE game appears to have
resulted in competitive behavior being largely replaced by cooperative behavior. So cheap
talk reduced the heterogeneity in behaviour, thereby reducing the complexity of observed
behaviours in the finitely repeated DSE game.
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Appendices
A Mathematical Proofs
A.1 Proof of lemma 1
Proof of lemma 1. Straightforward application of backward induction utilising proposition 1
shows that when either competitive or self seeking types are matched with other competitive
or self seeking types, the only equilibrium set of strategies given assumption 1 is (T, T ).
Now consider matchings involving one or more cooperative types. Turn taking which
extends to the final round will require one of the partners to play S in the penultimate
round. We now consider whether this is optimal play when each of the three player types is
matched with a cooperative player.
A self seeking player would play S in the penultimate round if they are partnered with a
cooperative player,and it is their turn to play S, as their payoff from continuing turn taking
exceeds playing T in the final two rounds, i.e. X > 2Z.
A cooperative player would play S in the penultimate round if they are partnered with
another cooperative player, and it is their turn to play S, as their utility from turn taking
in the final two rounds exceeds playing T in the final two rounds. X + 2B > 2Z.
Now consider the self seeker’s strategy in round R−n. First suppose n is odd. If the self
seeking player were to play S, then under turn taking they play T in the last period. Then
the player would play S in this period (continue turn taking), rather than end turn taking,
if:
(n+ 1)X
2
> (n+ 1)Z (8)
or X − 2Z > 0. Suppose n is even. Then self seekers play S if:
nX
2
+ Z > (n+ 1)Z (9)
or X − 2Z > 0. Thus self seeking players would continue turn taking in all rounds.
Now consider the cooperator’s strategy in round R − n. If n is even then a cooperative
play will S in period R−n and then will continue turn taking up to the last period (in which
they play S) as:
nX
2
+ (1− α)X + (n+ 1)B > (n+ 1)Z (10)
Similarly if n is odd a cooperative player will S in period R − n and then will continue
turn taking up to the last period (in which they play T ) as:
nX
2
+ (n+ 1)B > (n+ 1)Z (11)
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A.2 Proof of proposition 3
Proof of proposition 3. 1. Clearly self seeking and cooperative players would only consider
playing S in the penultimate round if it was believed that there is a sufficient probability
their partner would play S in the final round, i.e. is competitive. First consider the case of a
competitive player. This player’s gains greater utility from playing S (T ) in the penultimate
round if:
(1− α)X − F + λmR−1αX + (1− λmR−1)Z > (<)2Z (12)
Thus, by assumption 1, a competitive player would play T in the penultimate round if:
F > (1− α)X + λmR−1αX − (1 + λmR−1)Z ≡ F ∗R−1. (13)
Observe that F ∗R−1 < F ∗, so that under assumption 1 competitive players always play T
in the penultimate round.
Consider round R− n, where n ≥ 2. We now show a competitive player will choose T in
round R − n if they choose T in all rounds following R − n + 1. Under this assumption, a
competitive player would choose T if:
(1− α)X − F + λmR−nαX + (1− λmR−n)Z + (R− r − 1)Z < (R− r)Z (14)
or:
F (1− α)X + λmR−nαX − (1 + λmR−n)Z > F ∗ (15)
Thus, under assumption 1, competitive players choose T in each round.
2. If there is a sufficient history turn taking, a cooperative player will treat playing S in
the penultimate round and T in the final round, if it is their turn to do so, as a cooperative
act. In this case the cooperative player will play S in round R − 1 and T in round R (as
opposed to T in both rounds)provided:
(1− α)X +B + λoR−1αX + (1− λoR−1)Z +B > 2Z (16)
or:
B > B∗ − 1
2
([Z − (1− α)X]− λoR−1[αX − Z]) ≡ B∗R−1 (17)
Note that B∗ > B∗R−1, so under assumption 17 the cooperative participant plays S in the
penultimate period when it their turn to do so.
Consider round R− n, where n ≥ 2.If n is even then a cooperative play will S in period
R− n and then will continue turn taking up to the last period (in which they play S),while
cooperation continues, and when B > B∗R. If n is odd a cooperative player will S in period
R− n and then will continue turn taking up to the last period (in which they play T ).
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3. Turn taking will require one of the partners to play S in the penultimate round. We
now consider whether this is optimal play for each of the three player types.
A self seeking player would play S in the penultimate round if:
(1− α)X + λsR−1αX + (1− λsR−1)Z > 2Z (18)
or:
λsR−1 >
Z − (1− α)X
αX − Z = 1−
[αX − Z] + [2Z −X]
αX − Z ≡ λ
∗
R−1 (19)
Hence λ∗R−1 ∈ (0, 1). Note that turn taking must therefore be uninterrupted in all rounds
r > I otherwise the self seeking player could infer that their partner was not cooperative.
Now consider the self seeking strategy in round R−n. Suppose there is an uninterrupted
history of rounds I < r < R − n. First suppose n is odd. If the self seeking player were
to play S, then under turn taking they play T in the last period. Suppose if turn taking
continues that 4 holds. Then, as no new information available to the self seeking play during
rounds [r, ..R − 1], then λsR−n = λsR−1. Under these conditions the self seeking participant
would play S in round R− n as:
(n− 1)X
2
) + (1− α)X + λsR−1αX + (1− λsR−1)Z > (n+ 1)Z (20)
or:
λsR−n >
Z − (1− α)X − n−1
2
(X − 2Z)
αX − Z ≡ λ
∗
R−n (21)
Now λ∗R−n < λ∗R−1, so if (4) holds, self seeking player would be willing to continue turn
taking.
Suppose n is even. If (4) holds, both self seekers and cooperative types play S in the
penultimate round. Thus a self seeker will play S in round R− n if it is their turn to do so
if:
nX
2
+ Z > (n+ 1)Z (22)
or:
n(X − 2Z) > −2Z (23)
The self seeking player will play S if there is an uninterrupted history of turn taking from
round I. Then a self seeking player would be willing to continue turn taking in all rounds
up to the final round.
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B A three round DSE game
Three rounds is required to illustrate the properties of two important perfect Bayesian equi-
librium in a finitely repeated DSE game with more than one type. For this illustration it is
useful to assume there are only self seeking and cooperative type players (i.e.µ = 0).
B.1 A separating equilibrium
Define the following set of strategies and beliefs of participants in the three round DSE
game:.
Strategy and Belief set 3S: In round 1 self seekers play T and cooperative participants play
S, and all participants believe the probability their partner is cooperative is λ (corresponding
with the proportion of cooperative types in the population). Then:
• if the outcome in round 1 is (T, T ) then both (self seeking) participants play T in the
subsequent two round, and believe with probability 1 that their partner is self seeking.
• if the outcome in round 1 is (T, S) then play is (S, T ) in round 2 and (T, S) in round
3. Participant 1 believes their partner is cooperative and participant 2 believes their
partner is self seeking
• if the outcome in round 1 is (S, S) then both cooperative types randomise to achieve
coordination for turn taking in round 2, and randomise again in round 3 if coordination
is not achieved in round 2. In rounds 2 and 3 both participants believe with probability
1 that their partner is cooperative.
Then:
Proposition 5. Strategy and Belief set 3S is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium if λ is sufficiently
close to 1.
Observe that proposition 5 shows that set of strategies 3S represents a separating equilibrium
as participants signal their type in round 1. Its proof is as follows:
Proof of proposition 5. Proposition 1 applies to the pay in the final round (round 3) of the
three round DSE game. Observe that strategy and belief set 3S satisfies Proposition 1.
Now consider the conditions under which strategy 3S is an equilibrium strategy for each
type. First, it has been assumed that actions of cooperative types in strategy 3S is viewed
as cooperative play by cooperative type participants, so deviating from it will lower their
utility. Thus it represents an equilibrium strategy for them.
We now consider the conditions under which self seeking types to have no incentive to
deviate from strategy 3S. The payoff from conforming to the above strategy is:
λX + αX + 3(1− λ)Z (24)
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If the self seeking player deviates by playing S in round, and T in the final two round,
the expected payoff is:
(1− λ)X + Z + λV R (25)
where V R is the expected payoff from playing against a randomising type cooperative
type. Note that, assuming cooperative types play T with probability ψi in round i, V R =
(1− ψ2ψ3)αX + (1 + ψ2ψ3)Z
The self seeking player does not deviate from the equilibrium in round 1 provided:
λX + αX + 3(1− λ)Z > (1− λ)X + Z + λV R (26)
or
λ >
X − 2Z
X − 2Z + (1 + α)X − V R ≡ λ
∗
s (27)
As (1+α)X > V R, then 0 < λ∗s < 1. Hence self seeking players do not have an incentive
to deviate provided λ is sufficiently large.
Thus Strategy and Belief set 3S is an equilibrium strategy and belief profile if λ > λ∗s.
B.2 A semi-pooling equilibrium
Define the following set of strategies and beliefs for participants in the three round DSE
game:
Strategy and belief set 3P: In round 1 cooperative participants play S and self seek-
ers play T with a probability p1 , and all participants believe the probability their partner
is cooperative is λ (corresponding with the proportion of cooperative types in the popula-
tion).Then:
• if the outcome in round 1 is (T, T ) then both (self seeking) players play T in the
subsequent two round, and believe with probability 1 that their partner is self seeking
in these rounds.
• if the outcome in round 1 is (T, S). Participant 1 (who must be self seeking) plays S in
round 2 and T in round 3. If participant 2 is self seeking they play T in rounds 2 and
3. If player 2 is cooperative they play T in round 2 and S in round 3. Participant 2
believes their partner is self seeking with probability 1 in rounds 2 and 3. Participant
1 believes there is a probability λTS that their partner is cooperative in rounds 2 and
3.
• if the outcome in round 1 is (S, S) then a cooperative type randomises in round 2,
playing T with probability ψ2. In round 3 the cooperative type (i) takes their turn if
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coordination is achieved in round 2 or (ii) plays T in round 3 if coordination is not
achieved in round 2. Self seeking types play T in rounds 2 and 3. Both participants
believes there is a probability λSS that their partner is cooperative in round 2. In round
3 a participant believes and λSST that their partner is cooperative with probability λSST
they played T in round 2 and are certain their partner is cooperative if they played S
in round 2.
Then:
Proposition 6. Strategy and belief set 3P forms a perfect Bayesian equilibrium if λ∗2 < λ <
λ∗M where:
λ∗M ≡
2X − 3Z + ψ2(αX − Z)
X − 2Z (28)
and:
λTS = λSS =
λ
λ+ p1(1− λ) (29)
where:
p1 =
(1 + λψ2α)X − (1 + λψ2)Z
(1− λ)(2X − 3Z) (30)
An increase in α increases p1.
Observe that proposition 6 shows that set of strategies 3P represents a semi pooling equilib-
rium as only self seeking types play T in round 1 but both types of participants play S in
round 1. Hence only seek seekers playing T unambiguously signal their type 1.
Note that it is necessary that λ∗2 < 0.5 if this equilibrium identified in proposition 6 is to
exist, however this need not be the case.
Proof of proposition 6. Note that the self seeking player who mimics a cooperative player
in round 1, and who is paired with a self seeking player who does not mimic a cooperative
player, will achieve a payoff from that strategy of X + Z from that strategy as opposed to
3Z if they had played the Nash equilibrium.
Again, it is assumed that the actions adopted by cooperative types in strategy 3P is
viewed as cooperative by cooperative type participants, so deviating from it will lower their
utility.
We now turn to identify whether the play in strategy 3P is optimal of self seeking players.
First observe that it is necessary that (4) holds if a self seeking participant is to play S in
the second round as required by the above strategy. Hence it is necessary that λ > λ∗2 to
hold if strategy 3P is to be an equilibrium strategy.
The expected pay-off for the self serving types from playing T in round 1 is:
λ(X + αX) + p13(1− λ)Z + (1− p1)(1− λ)(X + Z) (31)
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If the self seeking player plays S in round 1, their expected pay-off is:
p1(1− λ)(X + Z) + (1− p1)(1− λ)2Z + λ[(1− ψ2)αX + (1 + ψ2)Z] (32)
The self seeking player is indifferent between playing T and S in round 1:
λ(X+αX)+p13(1−λ)Z+(1−p1)(1−λ)(X+Z) = p1(1−λ)(X+Z)+(1−p1)(1−λ)2Z+λ((1−ψ2)αX+(1+ψ2)Z)
(33)
or:
p1 =
(1 + λψ2α)X − (1 + λψ2)Z
(1− λ)(2X − 3Z) (34)
Note that p1 > 0. We require that p1 < 1 for the pooling equilibrium, i.e:
λ <
2X − 3Z + ψ2(αX − Z)
X − 2Z ≡ λ
∗
M (35)
This establishes that strategy and belief set 3P forms a semi-pooling perfect Bayesian
equilibrium if λ∗2 < λ < λ∗M .
Partial differentiation of (34) with respect to α shows that p1 is increasing in α. Note
this conclusion assumes ψ2 is independent of α, which is reasonable if B is sufficiently large
relative to monetary payoffs for cooperative types.
C A two round allocation game
Two rounds is sufficient to illustrate the key properties of two important perfect Bayesian
equilibrium in a finitely repeated allocation game with more than one type. At initial node,
N0, participants are assumed to know the true distribution of types in the population. In
the second round, the participants will be at one of the four possible nodes: Nkm where
k = T, S.
For this illustration it is useful to assume there are only self seeking and competitive type
players (i.e. λ = 0).
C.1 An equilibrium in which self seeking types mimic competitive
types
Define the following set of strategies and beliefs:
Strategy and belief set 2M: In round 1 cooperative players play S and self seekers play T
with a probability p1, and all participants believe the probability their partner is competitive
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Figure 1: The two round game
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is µ (corresponding with the proportion of cooperative types in the population). Then in
round 2:
• at node NTT then self seeking players randomise and competitive types play T , and
both participants believe with probability µTT that their partner is competitive.
• at node NTS Participant 1 (who is either self seeking or competitive) plays T and
participant 2 (who is self seeking) plays S. Participant 1 believe participant 2 is
competitive with probability 1, while participant 2 believes particiapnt 1 is competitive
with probability µTS.
• at node NST Participant 1 (who is self seeking) plays S and participant 2 (who is either
self seeking or competitive) plays T . Participant 2 believe participant 1 is competi-
tive with probability 1, while participant 1 believes particiapnt 2 is competitive with
probability µTS.
• at node NSS Both participants (who are self seeking) randomise, and both participants
believe their partner is self seeking with probability 1.
Then:
Proposition 7. Strategy 2M is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the two round allocation
game if:
µ <
α2(1 + α)
2(1− α(1− α)) (36)
and:
µTT = µTS =
µ
µ+ (p1(1− µ)) (37)
where:
p1 =
µ(1− α)(α− 2) + (1− µ)α(1 + α)
2(1− µ)(1− α(1− α)) (38)
Proposition 7 shows that strategy 2M is a semi pooling equilibrium, as only self seeking
types play S in round 1 but both types of participants play T in round 1. Its proof is as
follows.
Proof of proposition 7. Playing T at all nodes maximises the utility of competitive types, so
they have no incentive to deviate from the actions detailed in strategy 2M.
It remains to show that strategy 2M is an equilibrium one for self seeking types. First
consider the self seeking types choice of strategy at node NTT . Let qTT be the probability the
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self seeking type’s partner plays T . In order for the self seeking participant to be indifferent
between playing T and S it is necessary that qTT = α. Note that, at node NTT , the
probability that the partner is competitive is given by (37). Consequently the probability
that the self seeking participant plays T at node NTT , pTT is given implicitly by:
qTT =
µ+ pTT (p1(1− µ))
µ+ (p1(1− µ)) (39)
or:
pTT =
α(µ+ p1(1− µ))− µ
(p1(1− µ)) (40)
Note pTT < 1. However to ensure that pTT > 0 we require that:
α(µ+ p1(1− µ)) > µ (41)
That is, it is optimal to randomise at node NTT only if competitive types are a sufficiently
small fraction of the population.
Now consider the self seeking types choice of strategy at node NTS. In this case the
partner (who must be self seeking) will play S. Thus it is optimal for the self seeking player
to play T .
The expected payoff from playing T in round 1 is therefore:
(µ+ p1(1− µ))α(1− α)X + (1− p1)(1− µ)2αX (42)
Now consider the self seeking participants pay-off from playing S in round 1. At the node
NST the partner could be either self seeking or competitive. However playing S signals that
the participant is self seeking. So the partner will play T in round 2 and it is optimal for
the participant to play S.
At the nodeNSS the partner is self seeking, and will randomise, playing T with probability
α. The expected payoff is (1− α)αX
The expected payoff from playing S in round 1 is:
(µ+ p1(1− µ))2(1− α)X + (1− p1)(1− µ)α(1− α)X (43)
Hence the self seeking participant is indifferent between T and S in round 1 if:
(µ+p1(1−µ))α(1−α)X+(1−p1)(1−µ)2αX = (µ+p1(1−µ))2(1−α)X+(1−p1)(1−µ)α(1−α)X
(44)
Which yields (38). It is readily shown from (38) that 0 < p1 < 1. Hence strategy 2M is
a perfect Bayesian equilibrium provided (41) holds,that is provided 36 holds.
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C.2 An equilibrium in which self seeking types turn take
Define the following set of strategies and beliefs:
Strategy and belief set 2T: In round 1 competitive players play T and self seekers play T
with a probability p1, and all participants believe the probability their partner is competitive
is µ (corresponding with the proportion of cooperative types in the population). Then in
round 2:
• at node NTT then self seeking players randomise and competitive types play T , and
both participants believe with probability µTT that their partner is competitive.
• at node NTS Participant 1 plays S if self seeking and plays T if competitive, and
participant 2 (who is self seeking) plays T . Participant 1 believe participant 2 is
competitive with probability 1, while participant 2 believes particiapnt 1 is competitive
with probability µTS.Participant 2 believe participant 1 is competitive with probability
1, while participant 1 believes particiapnt 2 is competitive with probability µTS.
• at node NST Participant 1 (who is self seeking) plays T and participant 2 plays S if
self seeking and plays T if competitive.
• at node NSS Both participants (who are self seeking) randomise , and both participants
believe their partner is self seeking with probability 1.
Then:
Proposition 8. Strategy 2T is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the two round allocation
game if µ < α/2 and:
µTT = µTS =
µ
µ+ (p1(1− µ)) (45)
where:
p1 =
1− 2µ
2(1− µ) (46)
Proposition 8 shows that strategy 2T is a semi pooling equilibrium, as only self seeking types
play S in round 1 but both types of participants play T in round 1. Its proof is as follows.
Proof of proposition 8. Again it is optimal for competitive players to play T at each node.
We now consider w show that strategy 2T is an equilibrium one for self seeking types.
First consider the self seeking types choice of strategy at node NTT . Let qTT be the
probability the self seeking type’s partner plays T . In order for the self seeking participant
to be indifferent between playing T and S it is necessary that qTT = α. Note that, at node
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NTT , the probability that the partner is competitive is given by (37). Consequently the
probability that the self seeking participant plays T at node NTT , pTT is given implicitly by:
qTT =
µ+ pTT (p1(1− µ))
µ+ (p1(1− µ)) (47)
or:
pTT =
α(µ+ p1(1− µ))− µ
(p1(1− µ)) (48)
Note pTT < 1. However to ensure that pTT > 0 we require that:
α(µ+ p1(1− µ)) > µ (49)
That is, it is optimal to randomise at node NTT only if competitive types are a sufficiently
small fraction of the population.
Now consider the self seeking types choice of strategy at node NTS. In this case the
partner (who must be self seeking) will play T . Thus it is optimal for the self seeking player
to play S.
The expected payoff from playing T in round 1 is therefore:
(µ+ p1(1− µ))α(1− α)X + (1− p1)(1− µ)X (50)
Now consider the self seeking participants pay-off from playing S in round 1. At the node
NST the partner could be either self seeking or competitive. However playing S signals that
the participant is self seeking. So the partner will play S in round 2 and it is optimal for the
participant to play T .
At the nodeNSS the partner is self seeking, and will randomise, playing T with probability
α. The expected payoff is (1− α)αX
The expected payoff from playing S in round 1 is:
(µ+ p1(1− µ))X + (1− p1)(1− µ)α(1− α)X (51)
Hence the self seeking participant is indifferent between T and S in round 1 if:
(µ+p1(1−µ))α(1−α)X+(1−p1)(1−µ)X = (µ+p1(1−µ))X+(1−p1)(1−µ)α(1−α)X (52)
which yields (46). Substituting (46) into (49) shows we require µ < α/2 for strategy and
belief set 2T is to be a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
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Instruction File 
 
About this Experiment 
 
If you follow the instructions and make sound decisions based on the information you are provided 
with, you may earn money that will be paid to you in cash at the end of the session. 
 
What to do: 
 
1. Read through the instructions carefully.  
2. After reading the instructions, you will be taken to a short quiz that will test your 
comprehension of the instructions.  
3. Correctly answering ALL of the quiz questions will give you a unique password that you 
can use to login to the experiment. 
 
Overview of this experiment 
 
This experiment is concerned with the way people make decisions. 
  
To begin: 
 You can choose between two options. 
 You are paired with another player. 
 Your payoff depends on your choice and that of your paired player. 
 There will be a number of independent rounds.  
Experimental Rules 
 
You are being paid to participate in this experiment. Failure to comply with these rules will result in 
the forfeiture of earnings from this session and you will not be allowed to participate in future 
sessions. 
 
1. Talking is not permitted during the experiment: You must not share any information with 
others during the experiment 
2. Only the experiment windows are permitted to be open during the experiment: You are 
not permitted to operate other software such as email or internet during the experiment 
3. You may ask questions of the instructor during the experiment  
 
Instructors can answer questions about procedures but cannot provide you with advice about 
decisions or trading. You must make decisions and develop strategies by yourself. 
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At the Start 
Once you have successfully completed the quiz, you will be taken the login screen where you will 
enter your Player Number (provided to you by the instructor) and Password (obtained when you 
successfully complete the quiz).  
 
 
 
Once you have entered your Player Number and Password you will see the following screen: 
 
 
 
 
By clicking on the “information” tab you can access information about your choices. You can choose 
from the following menu selections: 
 
 Decision Table This table provides you with information on the payoffs from each set of 
decisions you and your partner make. 
 
Decision Table 
 
Clicking on the “DECISION TABLE” information tab will show you the payments that you and your 
paired player receive as a result of the decisions you and your paired player make in each round. 
The payments are measured in experimental dollars. Each experimental dollar is worth AUD $0.06.   
 
You will be assigned the role of either player A or B for the duration of the experiment. Your 
decision will be to choose either option A1 or A2 if you are player A, or option B1 or B2 if you are 
player B. The payment in the particular round to player B is the first number in each cell in the 
decision table and the payment to player A is the second number in each cell.   
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EXAMPLES ONLY: 
 
Example 1: 
If Player A chooses A2 and Player B chooses B1 then Player A earns 10 experimental dollars and 
Player B earns 20 experimental dollars. 
 
Example 2: 
If Player A chooses A1 and Player B chooses B1 then Player A earns 0 experimental dollars and 
Player B earns 0 experimental dollars. 
 
 
Procedure 
Step 1 – Making a decision 
 
For each round in the experiment, you will be asked to enter a decision. In order to make a decision, 
you must enter an appropriate value in the decision box. Enter a value of “1” for decision #1 (A1 or 
B1 depending on your role) or a value of “2” for decision #2 (A2 or B2 depending on your role). You 
will have 30 seconds to make a decision.  
 
 
Step 2 – Review decisions and income earnings 
 
On the conclusion of the decision period, your decision table will be updated with a summary of 
your decision, the decision of your paired player and your payment for that round. 
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Step 3 - Repeat of Steps 1-2 
 
Thirty (30) rounds with the procedure described above will be conducted. EACH ROUND IS 
INDEPENDENT. Decisions are only valid in the current round. The decision table will be the same in 
each round.  
 
Step 4 – Conclusion of experiment 
 
IMPORTANT: At the conclusion of the experiment you will be paid in cash the sum of the 
income you earned each round in addition to the turn up fee of AUD $10. 
 
Before you start the quiz 
 
You are being paid to participate in this experiment. Failure to comply with these rules will result in 
the forfeiture of earnings from this session and you will not be allowed to participate in future 
sessions. 
 
1. Talking is not permitted during the experiment: You must not share any  information with 
others during the experiment 
2. Only the experiment windows are permitted to be open during the experiment: You are not 
permitted to operate other software such as email or internet during the experiment 
3. You may ask questions of the instructor during the experiment  
 
 
Instructors can answer questions about procedures but cannot provide you with advice about 
decisions or trading. You must make decisions and develop strategies by yourself. 
 
Now that you have read the instructions – please click on the quiz located on your desktop. 
 
  
Quiz
 When all of your answers are correct, you will receive your password for the experiment.
The quiz uses the following decision table
Question 1 Which of the following is true:
A. The player assigned role A can choose between B1 and B2 as they see fit.
B. The player assigned role A must choose A2.
C. The player assigned role B can choose B1 or B2 as they see fit.
Your answer:
Question 2 Which of the following is true:
A. The player assigned role A must choose A1 if they chose A1 in the previous round.
B. The player assigned role A must choose A2 if they chose A1 in the previous round.
C. The player assigned role B can choose B1 or B2 as they see fit, irrespective of what action they chose in the previous round. 
Your answer:
Question 3 If the player assigned role A chooses A1 in the 7
th round and the player assigned role B chooses B2 in the 7th round then:
A. the payment from the decision period in the 7th round is:
(i). 20 experimental dollars to player A, 
(ii). 10 experimental dollars to player B.
B. the payment from the decision period in the 7th round is:
(i). 20 experimental dollars to player B, 
(ii). 10 experimental dollars to player A.
C. the payment from the decision period in the 7th round is:
(i). 0 experimental dollars to player B, 
(ii). 0 experimental dollars to player A.
Your answer:
Question 4 If the player assigned role A chooses A2 in the 15
th round and the player assigned role B chooses B2 in the 15th round then:
A. the payment from the decision period in the 15th round  is: 
(i). 20 experimental dollars to player A, 
(ii). 10 experimental dollars to player B.
B. the payment from the decision period in the 15th round  is: 
(i). 20 experimental dollars to player B, 
(ii). 10 experimental dollars to player A.
C. the payment from the decision period in the 15th round  is: 
(i). 0 experimental dollars to player B, 
(ii). 0 experimental dollars to player A.
Your answer:
Question 5 The experiment consists of:
A. 15 rounds, each with an identical decision table. 
B. 30 rounds, each with an identical decision table.
C. 30 rounds, each with differing decision tables.
Your answer:
When you have all the answers correct, the session manager will give you a unique password
Once you have your password, click on the experimental icon on your desktop
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